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I. THE INTERSECTION (MULTI-CAR COLLISION?) OF RELEVANCE, 
CHARACTER EVIDENCE, HEARSAY, AND AUTHENTICATION IN THE 
“SOCIAL NETWORKING” ERA 
 
 A. Hypothetical Fact Patterns 
 
Scenario 1:  Employee Alleges Harassment by Her Co-Worker 
 
 The alleged harasser, Alan, and the plaintiff, Vicky, were co-workers at XYZ, Inc.  They 
had been acquaintances at work for approximately a year before Vicky went to her supervisor to 
complain of sexual harassment by Alan.  Vicky wishes to introduce evidence at trial that Alan 
harassed her by posting repeated and unwelcome comments under several photos that she had 
uploaded to her Facebook page, such as “nice shoes,”2
 
 “looking so hot,” and “why don’t you 
wear that to work?”  
 She also claims that Alan posted inappropriate comments to her “Facebook Wall” 
regarding the music she listens to.  In reference to her listing the popular Rihanna song “Rude 
Boy,” Alan sent Vicky a Facebook message that “[I am] big enough and can get it up.” 
 
 Alan also allegedly printed out and showed several pictures of Vicky to other male 
employees of XYZ.  The photos show Vicky wearing a short red dress at a party, wearing a 
bikini during her vacation to Cancun, and riding a mechanical bull at a bar.  After Vicky learned 
of this, because the other co-workers started commenting on how she looked in a bikini—and 
how she’d look without it—she “de-friended” Alan. 
 
 Vicky admits that she was Facebook “friends” with Alan, but claims that she accepted his 
“friend request” soon after she met him and that it would have been extremely rude to deny his 
friend request at that time.  Alan claims that he was just flirting and joking with Vicky and that 
he thought it was welcomed by her.  He claims that Vicky could have “de-friended” him or asked 
him to stop earlier. 
 
 In response to Vicky’s complaint, their supervisor called them both in and told them to 
“be professional at work” and “keep their personal lives personal.”  Vicky does not feel that this 
was an adequate response.  She felt insulted, and that Alan “got away” with his actions.  She 
wanted Alan to be transferred, or at least disciplined in some way. 
 
Scenario 2:  Employee Alleges Harassment by Her Supervisor 
 
 Art is the supervisor of the plaintiff, Vicky, at XYZ, Inc.  Art had been Vicky’s 
supervisor for approximately two years and had been her primary performance evaluator before 
Vicky filed a sexual harassment complaint against him to HR.  Vicky wishes to introduce 
evidence at trial that Art repeatedly harassed her at work by making lewd comments about what 
she was wearing in the photos she posted to Facebook.  Several times, Art told Vicky that he 
                                                 
2 This comment is ambiguous on its face.  It might mean “nice shoes” or it might be a nod to one of the reputedly 
worst pick-up lines, “Nice shoes, wanna f___?”  In the picture to which it was posted, Vicky was in her bathing suit 
and barefoot. 
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would like better a certain outfit she was wearing at work “if she hiked up her skirt a bit,” or “if 
she wore high heels instead of flats,” like she had worn shorter dresses and high heels in a couple 
of the photos on Facebook.   
 
 Vicky and Art were never Facebook “friends,” but Vicky states that Art would come to 
her desk during the lunch hour and look over her shoulder while she was viewing her Facebook 
account.  While he was doing this, he would occasionally place his hands on her shoulders and 
give her a hasty massage.  She didn’t say anything the first time, because she knew she wasn’t 
supposed to be on Facebook on the company computer.  The second time it happened, she 
objected, and he told her she’d “better not complain,” because she had violated company rules.   
 
 When a female co-worker and friend of Vicky was viewing Vicky’s page on her 
company computer, Art took over the mouse and zoomed in on Vicky’s bust and derriere in the 
photos taken and said “Ooh boy, looky at that package!  I’d like to get some of that!  You think 
they sell that on e-Bay?” 
 
 According to some workers, Art would often ask other employees who were “Facebook 
friends” with Vicky to bring up her profile so that he could view pictures of her partying on the 
weekends.  When this came to Vicky’s attention, she became very uncomfortable at work and 
went to HR to complain.   
 
 Vicky also wishes to testify that one of her co-workers told her that Art said to the co-
worker that he didn’t know why Vicky was so “holier than thou,” because she listened to “slutty 
music,” like Rihanna’s “Rude Boy.”  Vicky claims that Art himself would sing or hum, in her 
presence in the workplace, certain songs that feature misogynistic and sexual lyrics.   
 
 In response to Vicky’s complaint, the head of HR told her that he had “spoken to” Art 
and told him to “grow up and get out of middle school,” but that his best advice was for Vicky to 
“ignore it, consider the source, and get your work done.”  Vicky alleges that after this, Art’s level 
of harassment increased to such an unbearable level that she was forced to quit her job.  She felt 
that HR could not be effective at controlling Art. 
 
 Vicky and Art have a mutual male acquaintance (not an XYZ employee) who is willing 
to testify that he once attended a party at Art’s home, and that Art was showing sexually explicit 
“home movies” in his den, and making passes at all the women present. 
 
 B. Evidence Questions Raised by the Hypotheticals 
 
 All evidentiary issues boil down to three questions: 
 
        1. Rule 401:  Is the evidence relevant to the case? 
 
        2. Do any more specific rules of evidence (e.g., the propensity rule; the hearsay 
rule; privileges; or the rules regarding subsequent remedial measures or 
compromise negotiations) exclude the evidence?  
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        3. Rule 403:  Should the trial court exercise its discretion to exclude the evidence for 
reasons of efficiency or the likelihood of unfair prejudice? 
 
 The hypothetical fact patterns above raise interrelated questions of relevance, character 
evidence, hearsay, nonhearsay, authentication, and the degree of likelihood of unfair prejudice.  
Should the employer wish to prove postings on Vicky’s Facebook page, for example, all of these 
areas of evidence law would be implicated. 
 
II. GENERAL RELEVANCE RULES:  RULES 401-403 
 
 A. Rules 401-402 
 
 By virtue of Rules 401-402, the threshold question for any evidence is whether the 
evidence is relevant to a “fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”  I.e., 
would the evidence help – in even the smallest way – to prove or disprove any such fact? 
 
 This hurdle is not very high:  it will be met if the evidence has any probative value 
regarding a fact that matters with regard to the issues, under the law and the pleadings, in the 
case. 
 
        ● In Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379 (2008), an ADEA 
case, the Court held that discriminatory action by other supervisors, against other 
employees than the plaintiff is not per se irrelevant, and its admissibility must be 
determined on a case by case basis under Rules 401 and 403. 
 
        ● Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456 (2006) (per curiam) (vacating and 
remanding the 11th Circuit’s decision on relevance): 
 
        [T]here was evidence that Tyson’s plant manager, who made the disputed 
hiring decisions, had referred on some occasions to each of the petitioners as 
“boy.”  Petitioners argued this was evidence of discriminatory animus.  The 
Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that “[w]hile the use of ‘boy’ when 
modified by a racial classification like ‘black’ or ‘white’ is evidence of 
discriminatory intent, the use of ‘boy’ alone is not evidence of discrimination.”  
Although it is true the disputed word will not always be evidence of racial 
animus, it does not follow that the term, standing alone, is always benign.  The 
speaker’s meaning may depend on various factors including context, inflection, 
tone of voice, local custom, and historical usage.  Insofar as the Court of 
Appeals held that modifiers or qualifications are necessary in all instances to 
render the disputed term probative of bias, the court’s decision is erroneous. 
 
 Q1: Is the Rule 401-402 requirement met by evidence of a sexual harassment 
plaintiff’s social interaction and sexual conduct, off work-site, with people 
who are not employed by and have no connection with the defendant? 
 
        ● If it is offered to show whether she welcomed the alleged harasser’s conduct, it 
likely meets Rule 401.  See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 
68-69 (1986) (question is whether sexual harassment plaintiff “by her conduct 
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indicated that the alleged advances were ‘unwelcome,’” and on this point her 
“sexually provocative speech or dress” is “obviously relevant”; court of appeals 
erred in holding that there was a “per se rule against admissibility” of evidence of 
such matters). 
 
        ● If the evidence is to be excluded, its exclusion would have to be based on a more 
specific relevance rule, Rule 412, which was amended post-Meritor. 
 
 Q2: Is the Rule 401-402 requirement met by off-worksite conduct by the alleged 
harasser, including his choice of provocative music, X-rated movies, reading 
materials, etc., that have nothing directly to do with the plaintiff? 
 
        ● Such evidence would pass the low bar created by Rules 401-402. 
 
        ● If it is to be excluded, its exclusion would have to be based on a more specific 
relevance rule, the “propensity rule” codified in Rule 404, or, if it passes the 
admissibility test on other acts evidence to show intent under Rule 404(b), its 
exclusion would have to be based on Rule 403. 
 
 B. The “Clean-Up Batter”:  Rule 403 
 
 Rule 403 provides that the court, in its discretion, may exclude relevant evidence if the 
court makes a finding (under Rule 104(a)) that the evidence’s “probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or 
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence.” 
 
 The 403 considerations may be summarized as:  How much probative value does this 
evidence add to the case?  Does it carry a high risk of unfair prejudice?  Is it worth the time 
it will take or the distraction it may cause? 
 
 Many “rules” established by the employment discrimination case law result from a Rule 
403-type analysis. 
 
 For example, under the “stray remarks” doctrine, the courts weigh the probative value 
of the remark against the risk that its admission would unfairly prejudice the fact-finder against 
the employer.  Thus, generally, the courts consider the following when evaluating the relevance 
of “stray remarks” to an allegedly discriminatory employment decision: 
 
 (a) Whether the disputed remark was made by the decision-maker (not merely an 
agent of the employer uninvolved in the challenged decision); 
 
 (b) Whether the disputed remark was isolated or part of a pattern of biased 
comments; 
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 (c) Whether the disputed remark was made close in time to the challenged decision; 
and 
 
 (d) Whether the disputed remark was ambiguous or clearly reflective of 
discriminatory bias. 
 
 See, e.g., Annot., 155 A.L.R. Fed. 283 (ADEA cases); Tooson v. Roadway Express, Inc., 
47 Fed. Appx. 370, 375 (6th Cir. 2002); McMillan v. Massachusetts SPCA, 140 F.3d 288, 300 
(1st Cir. 1998). 
 
 Q3: Should evidence of the alleged harasser’s reading materials, etc. be 
admissible on the issue of his intent when making comments to the plaintiff?  
Assuming that the evidence passes Rule 404, should it be excluded under 
Rule 403? 
 
        ● Is the evidence’s probative value that it “adds to the pot” significant?  Are his 
interests unambiguous?  Undisputed?  If either of the latter, is the proffered 
evidence worth the time?  Likely to result only in unfair prejudice against the 
employer?  
 
Cf. United States v. Curtin, 489 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (defendant’s reading material 
regarding sex with children was relevant to his intent to commit sex crime against a  minor, when 
defense was that he thought person who would meet him was an adult); Morse, Maryland 
Women is Convicted of Killing, Freezing Adopted Girls, BALT. SUN, Feb. 23, 2010, at A3 
(“Prosecutors . . . described how police found a lengthy printout of testimony from a D.C. child 
abuse case in [defendant] Bowman’s house.  Prosecutor John Maloney suggested that she was 
preparing her defense should her crimes be discovered.  ‘Who has night reading of grand-jury 
testimony, over an inch thick, from a D.C. child abuse case?’  Maloney asked jurors, holding up 
the court document.”); Note, Books as Weapons: Reading Materials and Unfairly Prejudicial 
Character Evidence, 31 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 257 (2009); Note, The Admissibility of an 
Accused’s Choice of Reading Material as Evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): 
What Are the Constitutional Implications of This Type of Evidence?, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & 
CIV. CONFINEMENT 349 (2008). 
 
III. CHARTS OF SPECIFIC RULES REGARDING CHARACTER EVIDENCE AND 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER ACTS 
 
 As the following charts illustrate, character evidence may be offered either as 
substantive evidence (Rules 404-406 and 412-415) or only as to credibility (impeachment or 
rehabilitation, Rules 608-609, and 806). 
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CHARACTER EVIDENCE RULES ROAD MAP 
 
Substantive Evidence:  Helps to Actually 
Prove Who Did What 
 
1.  General rule of exclusion: the “propensity 
rule” (1st parts of 404(a) & (b)) 
 
2.  Exceptions to propensity rule 
 
     a.  406: individual’s repeated, specific 
habit/routine of a business 
 
     b.  413-415: sexual assault defendants’ 
other acts of sexual assault/child 
molestation (only 415 applies in civil 
cases) 
 
     c.  412: sexual offense/harassment victims’ 
prior sex with defendant 
 
     d.  404(a)(1) & (2): only criminal cases and 
only when accused opens door 
 
3.  Purposes other than proving propensity 
 
     a.  404(b): limited permissible purpose of 
evidence of a person’s “other acts”, 
subject to 403 (see also 105 as to limiting 
instruction): 
- Motive 
- Intent 
- Knowledge 
- Opportunity 
- Absence of mistake or accident 
- Preparation 
- Common scheme/plan 
- Identity 
 
     b.  405(b): character an essential element 
 . . . (party must prove not merely an act, 
but character of a person . . .) (applicable 
in very few situations, including 
regarding employee’s relevant character 
trait when employer is sued for  
negligent hiring or retention) 
Character as to Truthfulness Only: 
Credibility Evidence Goes Only to Weight 
to be Given Substantive Evidence 
 
1.  608(b): ”prior bad acts” for which the 
witness (or hearsay declarant) was not 
convicted, but which are probative of 
untruthfulness 
 
2.  608(a): character witnesses to give opinion 
or reputation evidence re: a witness’s or a 
hearsay declarant’s character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness (on cross, 
character witness’s awareness of specific 
instances of principal witness may be 
inquired into, but only for limited purpose 
of impeaching the character witness, 405) 
 
3.  609: prior convictions of the witness or of a 
hearsay declarant 
 
4.  806: impeachment of hearsay declarants  
 
 
Methods of Proving Character When It Is 
Admissible 
 
405:  Generally, opinion or reputation 
testimony OK.  But see 412. 
 
          Specific acts maybe proved only under 
404(b), 608(b), or 609 (or under 405(b), 
in rare cases where character is an 
“essential element” of the claim or 
defense, i.e., character is directly at 
issue).  Otherwise, inquiry into specific 
instances is permitted only on cross of 
and only to impeach a 404(a) or 608(a) 
character witness (reputation or opinion 
witness). 
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JUDGE GRIMM’S CHARACTER EVIDENCE FLOWCHART 
   
       
   
       
 
  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
  
  
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                       Diagram © the Hon. Paul W. Grimm 
  
 
                                                                                                           
Analysis of Diagram.                                                                                                     The. Hon. Paul W. Grimm   
A ➜  Is the proposed use of evidence to prove propensity / circumstantial proof of character, as described in A? 
IF YES ➜  Then it is NOT admissible unless one of the exceptions in B applies.  If one of the exceptions in B 
applies, character may only be proved in one of the ways permitted in D. 
IF NO ➜  Then is use of proposed evidence relevant for some non-propensity purpose as described in C? 
 IF NO ➜   Evidence is not admissible. 
 IF YES ➜ Evidence is admissible for non-propensity purpose subject to 403 balancing, and a 
limiting instruction under Rule 105.  And any otherwise admissible evidence of the prior 
crime, wrong, or act may be admitted. 
 
Character evidence 
[404,405, 608 / 5-404, 5-405, 5-608] 
Circumstantial proof (i.e. propensity) 
Direct proof (Character at issue) 
Use of character evidence to impeach 
General Rule prohibiting 
circumstantial / propensity proof of 
character.  Rule 404.a. 
•  Evidence of a person’s gen’l 
character or a character trait not 
admissible to prove action in 
conformity therewith. 
A 
Use of evidence of prior 
acts/wrongs/crimes for some purpose 
other than proving propensity [404.b] 
C 
• Motive  • Absence of mistake 
• Intent  • Preparation 
• Knowledge • Common scheme/plan 
• Opportunity • Identity 
Exceptions B 
404.a.1: Criminal cases, D introduces proof of D’s  character, 
state/gov’t rebuts (i.e., character trait of peacefulness). 
• How proven: Opinion or reputation evidence (Rule 405). 
404.a.2: Criminal case, D introduces proof of V’s character, 
state/gov’t rebuts (character trait of aggressiveness) 
• How proven: Opinion or reputation evidence (Rule 405). 
404.a.3: Use of character to impeach [607, 608, 609] 
• How proven: Opinion or reputation evidence (Rule 405). 
405: Direct proof of character when it is “at issue” in a case 
[seduction cases, negligent entrustment, defense of truth in 
defamation case] 
• How proven: Opinion, reputation evidence, or specific acts 
(Rule 405). 
406: Habit or business routine 
        (Rule 406)                                                       LMcL 
412-415: Special roles in rape and other sexual assault cases 
     LMcL 
How to prove character in cases when it 
is admissible [405]. 
   1. Opinion testimony (compliance 
w/701, 702 req’d) 
   2. Reputation testimony (Hearsay, but 
803(21) allows it). 
   3. Specific acts – only if character is 
at issue, and direct proof is 
permissible.  (Otherwise, only on 
cross to impeach reputation or 
opinion witness.  LMcL) 
 
D 
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE USE OF CHARACTER EVIDENCE:  RULES 404-406 AND 412-
415 
 
 A. “Me, Too” 
 
 Q4: Suppose for example, that plaintiff Vicky wants to introduce evidence that 
Alan (or Art) had also harassed others?  Or that others had at least alleged 
that Alan (or Art) had harassed them?  And he denies it? 
 
        ● Now it’s generally a Rule 401/Rule 404/Rule 403 issue.  Rules 415 and 406 
come into play only in very limited circumstances. 
 
 B. Rule 415: Other Sexual Assaults by the Alleged Harasser 
 
 Rule 415 will apply, to permit the evidence (subject to Rule 403) only if the prior events 
were sexual assaults, as defined in Rule 413(d) (see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2245).   
 
 The Congressional analysis supporting Rule 415 explained that such evidence   
 
could be considered as evidence that the defendant has the motivation or 
disposition to commit sexual assaults, and a lack of effective inhibitions against 
acting on such impulses, and as evidence bearing on the probability or 
improbability that the defendant was falsely implicated in the offense of which he 
or she is presently accused.   
 
137 Cong. Rec. at S3239 (daily ed. Mar. 1991).   
 
 Rule 415 tips toward admissibility, but the evidence may be excluded under Rule 403, 
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risks of unfair prejudice, confusion 
or distraction of the jury, or by undue consumption of trial time.   
 
        ● Johnson v. Elk Lake School Dist., 283 F.3d 138, 149-59 (3d Cir. 2002) (no abuse 
of discretion in exclusion of evidence, in sexual harassment suit, regarding 
touching of another female by defendant, when second female’s testimony was 
equivocal as to whether touching seemed intentional).   
 
        ● Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 
1996) (in a Title VII sexual harassment suit against a corporate employer, in order 
for evidence of defendant’s agent’s prior sexual misconduct to be admissible 
under Rule 415, the “evidence of defendant’s agent’s misconduct must be both 
probative in that it proves corporate knowledge of similar misconduct and it must 
corroborate plaintiff’s story; otherwise, the prejudicial effect on the jury is not 
substantially outweighed”). 
 
 Rule 415 contains a notice requirement. 
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        ● EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 512 (6th Cir. 2001) (EEOC 
complied with notice requirement under Rule 415 in same-sex sexual harassment 
case). 
 
 C. Rule 406:  Habit or Business Routine 
 
        ● Rule 406 will not apply to admit the evidence addressed in Q4 above, because, 
even though one might say, colloquially that Alan (or Art) was “in the habit” of 
harassing females, his actions are not of the semi-automatic nature embraced by 
Rule 406.  Examples of Rule 406-type evidence would be, e.g., always smoking 
cigarettes to the filter; always putting one’s belt on from left to right; routinely 
optically scanning certain records and destroying paper copies. . . . 
 
 D. Rule 404:  both the first clause of 404(a) and the first sentence of 404(b) codify 
the “propensity rule” of exclusion.   
 
 When proof of character is offered merely to show that a person is a “good” or “bad 
person, either in general or with regard to a particular trait, and thus as circumstantial 
evidence that the person acted “in character” and did the “right” or “wrong” thing in the 
incident at issue at trial, it is inadmissible. 
 
        ● Beware:  The protection of the propensity rule may be waived by making a 
sweeping claim of innocence in opening statement or by testifying on direct, e.g., 
“I’ve never touched a woman other than my wife.”  Such a claim may well open 
the door to other acts evidence that would not otherwise have been admissible.  
E.g., Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954); United States v. Johnson, 634 
F.2d 735, 737-38 (4th Cir. 1980). 
 
 E. Rule 404(b):  Evidence of “other acts” (either good or bad acts, and either prior 
or subsequent to the conduct at issue at trial), is not excluded by the propensity 
rule when it has special relevance to a contested, narrower issue in the case, “such 
as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, common scheme or plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.” 
 
        ● Ansell v. Green Acres Contracting Co., 347 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2003) (evidence of 
subsequent “good” act properly admitted to prove non-discriminatory intent); in 
ADEA case, evidence was properly admitted that foreman who had fired plaintiff 
subsequently hired an employee of the same age as plaintiff). 
 
  1. Intent (a/k/a absence of mistake, accident, or nondiscriminatory purpose) 
is critical to the resolution of an employment discrimination claim. 
 
        ● Johnson v. Hugo’s Skateway, 974 F.2d 1408, 1413 (4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (no 
abuse of discretion to admit evidence of a 1979 consent order on limited question 
whether defendant had posted signs or instructed its employers as to 
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nondiscriminatory practices, as required by the order; evidence was relevant to 
defendant’s motive and intent in actions taken against plaintiffs). 
 
        ● Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1988) (racial 
slurs were relevant to show racial animus; their exclusion was harmless error). 
 
        ● Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (alleged 
harasser’s similar acts with regard to others may be relevant to his or her intent). 
 
        ● Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for 
injuries caused by alleged sexual abuse of child of third marriage, reversible error 
to exclude evidence of sexual abuse of defendant’s child by second marriage, 
which negated several defenses, including that child plaintiff’s injuries were self-
inflicted). 
 
  2. Identity can also be an issue, particularly where the plaintiff needs to 
prove from whom harassment, such as hang-up calls or intrusion of her 
personal workspace or belongings came. 
 
        ● Cf. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 945 (4th Cir. 1988) (in civil suit for 
injuries caused by alleged sexual abuse of child of third marriage, reversible error 
to exclude evidence of sexual abuse of a defendant’s child by second marriage, 
which tended to identify defendants as the abusers since only they had access to 
both girls). 
 
 Q5: Is the special relevance requirement of Rule 404(b) met by the evidence 
regarding off-worksite conduct by Art at his party? 
 
        ● In response to an objection, “improper character evidence,” the plaintiff should 
respond that the evidence is relevant to Art’s intent in his actions toward her. 
 
 F. Remember Rule 403 
 
 Even if evidence is relevant for a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b), a party may 
seek its exclusion under Rule 403. 
 
 In making a determination whether to exclude other acts evidence under Rule 403, a 
judge should consider questions of the following type: 
 
         1. How compelling is the proof of the other acts? 
 
   N.B.  Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988) held that the 
proponent of the evidence must present only enough evidence to permit a 
reasonable jury to find, under Rule 104(b), by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the other acts were committed by the person in question.  
The trial judge need not be persuaded of the truth of the evidence.  (The 
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strength of proof, however, may influence the trial court’s Rule 403 
ruling.) 
 
  2. If the other events allegedly happened long ago, how probative are they? 
 
  3. Can the alleged perpetrator be expected to adequately defend against 
them? 
 
  4. How long would hearing the evidence on these matters take? 
 
      5. Of how much help will this evidence likely be to the jury in properly 
resolving the issue before it? 
 
        ● See, e.g., Wyatt v. Horkley Self Serve, Inc., 325 Fed. Appx. 488 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(unpublished) (mem.) (evidence was properly admitted as relevant to alleged 
harasser’s motive and intent, and plaintiff’s lack of consent). 
 
        ● Rudin v. Lincoln Land Community College, 420 F.3d 712 (7th Cir. 2005) 
(discussing “direct evidence” of discriminatory intent—an admission that 
defendant is acting based on prohibited classification—and “circumstantial 
evidence” of discriminatory motivation). 
 
        ● Gasper v. Ruffin Hotel Corp., 960 A.2d 1228, 1234-37 (Md. App. 2008), cert. 
granted, 968 A.2d 1064 (Md. 2009) (no abuse of discretion, in excluding under 
the corollary Md. Rule 5-403, evidence of plaintiff’s supervisor’s previous 
termination by same employer for sexual harassment, offered as relevant to his 
motive and intent in retaliatory discharge of plaintiff, who had complained to him 
of sexual harassment by another employee).  
 
 Q6: In response to a Rule 403 objection, should the court admit the evidence 
regarding Art’s party at his home? 
 
 Q7: “Me, too.”  If Vicky calls other women who worked for Art, either as 
employees or providers of contractual services, to show that he also made 
inappropriate sexual remarks to them, should this be admitted to show Art’s 
intent, over a Rule 403 objection? 
 
        ● King v. McMillan, 594 F.3d 301, 308, 310-11 (4th Cir. 2010) (no abuse of 
discretion in admitting “me, too” evidence during same time frame of plaintiff’s 
employment, both to show that the supervisor’s unwelcoming conduct was due to 
plaintiff’s gender and to show that it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create 
a hostile work environment). 
 
As to the plaintiff’s acts, see, e.g., Stover v. Hattiesburg Public School Dist., 549 F.3d 988, 993-
94 (5th Cir. 2008) (no abuse of discretion, in case alleging retaliation, to permit plaintiff to be 
impeached by evidence that she deleted her work computer files on the day she resigned).  
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 G. Limiting Instructions:  Rule 105   
 
 If the evidence is admitted under Rule 404(b) or for any other limited purpose, a limiting 
jury instruction should be given on request.   
 
        ● United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 1079, 1088-89 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding no plain 
error in trial judge’s failure to sua sponte give limiting instruction regarding 
evidence properly admitted under Rule 404(b)).   
 
 A jury instruction regarding the limited purpose of evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) 
should not be a mere laundry list of categories under that rule; it should be focused, so as to help 
the jury to use the evidence only for the proper purpose.   
 
        ● See, e.g., United States v. Teague, 737 F.2d 378, 381 (4th Cir. 1984) (no error in 
admission of other crimes evidence; inter alia, “immediately after receipt of this 
testimony before the jury, the court gave an excellent charge instructing the jury 
that it could consider such testimony only in trying to determine the defendant’s 
motive, intent, knowledge or state of mind and such testimony could not be 
considered in determining whether the defendant committed the act or acts 
charged in the indictment.  This is in keeping with this court’s suggested 
procedure.  This charge was also repeated in the final jury instructions.”) 
(citations omitted). 
 
 H. When, if Ever, is a Person’s “Character” an “Essential Element” of a Claim 
or Defense, Under Rule 405(b)? 
 
 Rule 405(b) provides that reputation testimony, opinion testimony, and evidence of 
specific instances are all admissible to prove a person’s character or character trait, when that    
person’s character is an “essential element of a [criminal] charge, [civil] claim, or defense. 
. . .”  N.B.  Character is not an “essential element” just because only persons “of a certain 
character” might do an act of the kind charged.  See Gibson v. Mayor & Council, 355 F.3d 215, 
232-33 (3d Cir. 2004).  If proof that the party did the alleged act would suffice to prove the case, 
then character is not an essential element.   
 
 Rather, for 405(b) to apply, the substantive law requires that someone’s character must 
be proven, as an element of the charge, claim, or defense.  In the very rare situation that 
character is such an essential element, the most probative—and the most time-consuming—
method of proof is permitted:  proof by specific instances.  One might reasonably wonder why 
Rule 404 says nothing on this topic and instead it is hidden away in 405(b).  The answer is that 
Rule 404 does not exclude such “essential element” evidence, because it is not offered to prove 
action in conformity with character, but to prove character itself. 
 
 In negligent hiring or retention cases, the plaintiff must show that the employer knew 
or should have known of the employee’s bad character for the pertinent trait.  In such cases, the 
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plaintiff may prove the employee’s character by reputation or opinion evidence or by evidence of 
specific acts by the employee, or any combination of the three. 
 
 I. Other Sexual Conduct of Plaintiff:  Rule 412’s “Rape Shield,” Extended in 
1994 to Civil Cases 
 
  1. Was the sexual advance by the alleged harasser unwelcome to the 
plaintiff? 
 
 Rule 412(b)(2) tips strongly against admissibility of other sexual conduct by the 
plaintiff.  The Rule provides: 
 
 In a civil case, evidence offered to prove the sexual behavior or sexual 
predisposition of any alleged victim is admissible if it is otherwise admissible under these 
rules and its probative value substantially outweighs the danger of harm to any victim and 
of unfair prejudice to any party.  Evidence of an alleged victim’s reputation is admissible 
only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim. 
 
Rule 412(b)(2)’s balancing test is the opposite of Rule 403’s (if probative value and risk of unfair 
prejudice are equal, the Rule 403 test would keep the evidence in, but Rule 412 excludes it; Rule 
412, the more specific of the two, governs as to 412 issues).  As under Rule 609)b), the evidence 
is in under 412 only if its proponent shows that its probative value “substantially outweighs” the 
countervailing risks.  See Note, But She Spoke in an Un-Ladylike Fashion!:  Parsing Through 
the Standards of Evidentiary Admissibility in Civil Lawsuits After the 1994 Amendments to the 
Rape Shield Law, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 661 (2009). 
 
 Evidence of a plaintiff’s behavior at the defendant’s workplace is the type most likely 
to be admissible. 
 
        ● Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 643-47 (8th Cir. 2006) (district 
court’s admission of plaintiff’s workplace behavior including her “sexually 
explicit language,” her comments about “vibrators and men’s sex organs,” and her 
speaking in a “rude, lewd, and unlady-like fashion,” while she worked with 
alleged harassers was proper). 
 
        ● B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversible error to 
admit evidence of sexual harassment plaintiff’s out-of-workplace speech to 
coworker and her conduct at her home in front of him and a fellow officer; 
instruction to disregard did not cure error). 
 
        ● Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2000) (harmless error to admit 
evidence, on issue whether plaintiff was injured by display of pornography at 
work, that she had voluntarily viewed pornography outside the workplace). 
 
        ● Rodriguez-Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1998) 
(district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of plaintiff’s 
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alleged promiscuity and the marital status of her boyfriend, but admitting 
evidence that her relationship distracted her from work and, on issue whether 
advances were unwelcome, evidence that she flirted with allegedly harassing 
customer). 
 
        ● Saffa v. Oklahoma Oncology, Inc., 405 F.Supp.2d 1280, 1285-86, 1290-91 (D. 
Utah 2005) (pretrial ruling excluding evidence of sexual harassment plaintiff’s 
consensual sexual relationship with another doctor five years earlier, before 
plaintiff was employed by defendant, when doctor was separated from his wife; 
there was no evidence that alleged harasser knew of this relationship, but ruling 
that if plaintiff called the earlier doctor to testify, their relationship would be 
relevant to credibility; also ruling that if plaintiff testified at trial that “she never 
thinks in terms of affairs,” as she has in deposition testimony, the testimony [will 
be] relevant for impeachment”; further, evidence of plaintiff’s conduct, and 
statements regarding the alleged harasser at the employer’s Christmas party, will 
be admissible, with regard to whether his remarks had offended her and with 
regard to her claim of emotional distress). 
 
 As to a plaintiff’s having previously made similar but false allegations, cf. Note, The Girl 
Who Cried Wolf: Missouri’s New Approach to Evidence of Prior False Allegations, 70 MO. L. 
REV. 813 (2005) (suggesting balancing test that would have been appropriate for the court to 
have adopted in State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27 (Mo. 2004) (en banc)). 
 
  2. What is “sexual behavior or sexual predisposition”?   
 
 The Advisory Committee note to Rule 412 explains:   
 
Past sexual behavior connotes all activities that involve actual physical conduct, i.e., 
sexual intercourse and sexual contact, or that imply sexual intercourse or sexual contact.  
* * *  In addition, the word ‘behavior’ should be construed to include activities of the 
mind, such as fantasies or dreams.  * * * This amendment is designed to exclude 
evidence that does not directly refer to sexual activities or thoughts but that the proponent 
believes may have a sexual connotation for the factfinder.  Admission of such evidence 
would contravene Rule 412’s objectives of shielding the alleged victim from potential 
embarrassment and safeguarding the victim against stereotypical thinking.  Consequently, 
unless the (b)(2) exception is satisfied, evidence such as that relating to the alleged 
victim’s mode of dress, speech, or life-style will not be admissible. 
 
        ● Jaros v. Lodgenet Entertainment Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(evidence of harassment plaintiff’s “suggestive clothes” was properly excluded), 
abrogated on other grounds,  Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 
(2004). 
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  3. Notice and Procedure 
 
        ● Sheffield v. Hilltop Sand & Gravel Co., 895 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Va. 1995) 
(sanctioning defendant for failing to follow procedural requirement of submitting 
matters under seal by excluding evidence of co-workers’ testimony regarding 
plaintiff’s sexual conversations at workplace other than with alleged harasser). 
 
  4. How does Rule 412 affect discovery? 
 
 The Advisory Committee Note states:  
 
[D]iscovery of a victim’s past sexual conduct or predisposition in civil cases . . . will be 
continued to be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26.  In order not to undermine the rationale 
of Rule 412, however, courts should enter appropriate orders pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
26(c) to protect the victim against unwarranted inquiries and to ensure confidentiality.  
* * * In an action for sexual harassment, for instance, while some evidence of the alleged 
victim’s sexual behavior and/or predisposition in the workplace may perhaps be relevant, 
non-work place conduct will usually be irrelevant. 
 
 See Note, Unfolding Discovery Issues that Plague Sexual Harassment Cases, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 991 (2006) (discussing, inter alia, Rule 25 court-ordered mental examinations); 
Herchenroeder v. Johns Hopkins Univ. Applied Physics Laboratory, 171 F.R.D. 179 (D.Md. 
1997) (Grimm, J.); Barta v. City & County of Honolulu, 169 F.R.D. 132 (D. Hawaii 1996) 
(granting motion for protective order); Priest v. Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755 (N.D. Cal. 1983) 
(granting motion for protective order). 
 
  5. May the defense circumvent the protections of Rule 412 by offering 
evidence of what the alleged harasser had heard about the plaintiff, to 
show the alleged harasser’s absence of  invidious intent when, say, 
making a sexually explicit remark?   
 
 See United States v. Saunders, 943 F.2d 388, 391 & 392 n.1 (4th Cir. 1991) (Rule 412 
plainly “manifests the policy that it is unreasonable for a defendant to base his belief of consent 
on the victim’s past sexual experiences with third persons. . . .”).   
 
V. HEARSAY 
 
 A. Is the Evidence Offered for a Hearsay Purpose?  Rules 801(a)-(c)   
 
 Hearsay = an out-of-court statement (by the “hearsay declarant”) + that is offered today 
at trial to prove that what the declarant said when making that statement was factually 
accurate (“OCS” + “TOMA” = HS).   
 
        ● Mack v. ST Mobile Aerospace Engineering, Inc., 195 Fed. Appx. 829, 842 (11th 
Cir. 2006) (plaintiff’s testimony that supervisor did not tell him he was required to 
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see someone else about harassment policy was not hearsay, as he did not testify to 
a statement). 
 
 “Out-of-court” means that the evidence offered today at trial is of a statement made 
by any person somewhere else at another time.  The other place may even have been another 
court proceeding.  It is still “out-of-court” EVEN IF THE DECLARANT IS AT TRIAL 
TESTIFYING TO HIS OR HER OWN EARLIER STATEMENT.   
 
 If the evidence offered includes an “OCS” of a person, it is hearsay only if it is offered at 
trial to prove “TOMA.”  TOMA = the truth of some fact, or matter, that was being asserted 
by the declarant before trial, at the time the declarant made the out-of-court statement.  
  
 “Statement” may include an implied assertion from an utterance in words, if the utterance 
appears to have been intended by the declarant, at the time the declarant made the utterances, as 
an assertion of the fact the evidence is offered at trial to prove.   
 
 Steps in analysis: 
 
        1. Identify all the out-of-court declarants in the evidence being offered.   
 
        2. What was each declarant asserting at the time s/he made the OCS?   
 
        3. For what purpose, to help to prove what relevant fact, is the proponent 
offering the evidence at trial?   
 
        4. It’s hearsay only if the proponent is asking the jury to rely on what the 
declarant said in his/her OCS as true, accurate, correct.   
 
   See, e.g., Matthews v. Wisconsin Energy Corp., 534 F.3d 547, 557 (7th 
Cir. 2008). 
 
        5. Evidence of an OCS is hearsay if it will help to prove what it is offered to prove, 
only if our thought process to make the OCS relevant must be “Declarant 
wouldn’t have said this, unless it was true.”   
 
        6. On the other hand, if it is relevant simply that the OCS was made, regardless 
whether the OCS was true, it is nonhearsay.  In this event, the person testifying 
to the OCS can be fully cross-examined as to whether the OCS was made as s/he 
has testified. 
 
 B. Significant Relevance for a Nonhearsay Purpose Avoids the Exclusionary 
Hearsay Rule 802   
 
 If a hearsay objection is made, and the evidence appears to contain an OCS of a person, 
the burden falls to the proponent of the evidence to explain to the court how the evidence either 
(1) is nonhearsay or (2) falls within a hearsay exception. 
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 If counsel can come up with a significant, relevant, nonhearsay purpose for admitting an 
out-of-court statement, the hearsay rule (Rules 802 and 801(a)-(c)) will not exclude it. 
 
 The judge will consider the effectiveness of a Rule 105 limiting instruction in 
determining whether to exclude the evidence under Rule 403, but if the nonhearsay purpose goes 
to a significant, and not-stipulated-to-, issue in the case, the evidence should come in. 
 
 C. Frequently Relevant Nonhearsay Purposes 
 
 If offered for a nonhearsay purpose, a limiting instruction under Rule 105 is appropriate. 
 
  1. Notice to, or effect on, hearer or reader 
 
   a. To show reader or hearer’s knowledge and thus how that 
knowledge affected his or her conduct 
 
        ● See Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 120-24 (S.D. Ohio 1999) 
(reversing its decision to admit evidence of plaintiff’s extra-marital affair with 
supervisor at an earlier place of employment, when it was not shown that the 
alleged harasser had heard of it). 
 
        ● U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1035 (W.D. 
Wis. 2009) (e-mail sent by a client of the defendant temporary staffing agency, 
declining to hire hearing-impaired worker, in response to agency’s e-mail 
referring hearing-impaired worker as potential job candidate and warning client-
employer about hearing impairment, was not inadmissible hearsay in ADA action 
filed by EEOC; it was not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted by the 
client, but rather to show the effect the e-mail had on the agency). 
 
        ● B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dept., 276 F.3d 1091, 1095-97 (9th Cir. 2002) (statements 
made by plaintiff of which alleged harasser was aware)  
 
 When the plaintiff alleges retaliation for her complaint about illegal activity, her 
complaint is relevant to show that the defendant knew she had complained, rather than to prove 
that her complaint was true.   
 
        ● E.g., Cones v. Shalala, 199 F.3d 512, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Iweala v. Operational 
Technologies Services, Inc., 634 F.Supp.2d 73, 83 (D.D.C. 2009).  See Holbrook 
v. Reno, 196 F.3d 255 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for 
employee, where plaintiff had made no showing that person who took adverse 
action against her knew of her complaint).   
 
 When the plaintiff alleges that the employer was on notice that the allegedly 
discriminating supervisor or co-worker had committed similar acts against others in the past 
18 
 
and the employer had taken inadequate curative steps, evidence that the employer had been told 
of the earlier acts is relevant for a nonhearsay purpose.   
 
        ● See Green v. Administration of Tulane Educational Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 660 (5th 
Cir. 2002); Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(evidence of supervisor’s sexual harassment of others was properly admitted as 
relevant to issue of defendant-employer’s deliberate indifference to and 
condonation of his conduct, as well as arguably relevant to one or more Rule 
404(b) purposes with regard to defendant-supervisor himself). 
 
        ● Deters v. Equifax Credit Information Services, Inc., 202 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 
2000) (evidence of perpetrator’s sexual harassment of another female employee 
than plaintiff was properly admitted to show notice to employer); Bailey v. USF 
Holland, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 831 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (inadequate steps taken to 
remedy hostile work environment). 
 
        ● Cleveland v. KFC National Management Co., 948 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ga. 
1996) (in a Title VII sexual harassment suit against a corporate employer, in order 
for evidence of defendant’s agent’s prior sexual misconduct to be admissible 
under Rule 415, the “evidence of defendant’s agent’s misconduct must be both 
probative in that it proves corporate knowledge of similar misconduct and it must 
corroborate plaintiff’s story; otherwise, the prejudicial effect on the jury is not 
substantially outweighed”).   
 
 The defendant also may offer evidence of complaints it received about the plaintiff, not 
for the truth of the matter asserted, but to show its good faith   
 
        ● E.g., Velez v. Thermo King de Puerto Rico, Inc., 585 F.3d 441, 445 n.1 (1st Cir. 
2009); Maday v. Public Libraries, 480 F.3d 815 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 
   b. Statements made to plaintiff, creating an abusive work 
environment 
 
        ● E.g., Wilson v. City of Des Moines, 442 F.3d 637, 641 (8th Cir. 2006) (co-
worker’s references to plaintiff as a “bitch,” etc., were not offered for their truth; 
exclusion was harmless error). 
 
        ● Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 638 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 
        ● Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir. 1991) (co-worker had given plaintiff 
an anonymous note that stated, “I cried over you last night and I’m totally drained 
today,” and mailed her a letter that stated:  “I know that you are worth knowing 
with or without sex. . . .  I have enjoyed you so much over these past few months.  
Watching you.  Experiencing you from O so far away.”). 
 
        ● Socks-Brunot v. Hirschvogel, Inc., 184 F.R.D. 113, 115-16 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
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  2. Circumstantial evidence of out-of-court declarant’s state of mind or 
knowledge   
 
        ● E.g., Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 844 n.5 & 848 (M.D. Tenn. 
2006).   
 
        ● See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (evidence of 
employer’s treatment of employees of different race then plaintiff is “[e]specially 
relevant” to whether employer’s proffered explanation is pretextual. 
 
 Q8: Does the hearsay rule exclude this evidence?  HR director:  “[Job 
applicant’s] mother died from colon cancer.”   
 
        ● See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg et 
seq., which went into effect in late 2009. 
 
 Q9: Constructive discharge case:  plaintiff offers her statements, “You all are so 
vicious to me.  Working here is like working in hell!”   
 
        ● See, e.g., Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129 (2004). 
 
        ● Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 850 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) (hostile 
work environment plaintiffs’ statements circumstantially showing their awareness 
of use of racial epithets). 
 
  3. The prior statement is inconsistent with the declarant’s testimony at trial 
and is offered only to impeach the declarant (Rule 613) 
 
        ● E.g., United States v. Watkins, 591 F.3d 780, 787 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 
  4. The making of the prior statement is itself an improper discriminatory 
act, and is offered not for its truth, but as a “verbal act” or legally 
operative fact 
 
        ● Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 847, 849 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) 
(racial epithets used against the plaintiffs at the workplace). 
 
 D. Out-of-Court Statements Admissible for Their Truth:  Rules 801(d), 803-804, 
807 
 
  1. Rule 801(d)(2):  Statement of a Party Opponent 
 
 The defense may offer plaintiff’s statements for their truth and vice-versa. 
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   a. When are a co-worker’s or supervisor’s statements admissible 
against the employer, for their truth, under 801(d)(2)(D) as 
statements made during the employment or agency relationship 
and concerning a matter within the scope of that employment or 
agency? 
 
Admissible: E.g., Tisa v. Beasley FM Acquisition Corp., 343 Fed. Appx. 793 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(unpublished) (declarant was employee’s “ ‘agent independent contractor,’ see 
American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 
1434-39 (3d Cir. 1994), who had a ‘heavy hand in operations’ ”). 
 
        ● Bailey v. USF Holland, Inc., 444 F.Supp.2d 831, 850 (M.D. Tenn. 2006) 
(supervisor’s statement, refusing to take action about co-workers’ use of racial 
epithets against plaintiffs). 
 
Inadmissible: E.g., Ramirez v. The GEO Group, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d 1170, 1179-80 (D. Colo. 
2009) (no evidence that declarant commenting as to ground for plaintiff’s 
termination had any part in the decision-making process). 
 
        ● Di Giovanna v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 651 F.Supp.2d 193, 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(in employee’s suit alleging FMLA violation, statement of co-worker who had 
nothing to do with any decisions regarding plaintiff’s FMLA leave). 
 
        ● Young v. James Green Management, Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 622-23 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(Rule 801(d)(2)(D) not applicable to statements made by defendant’s employee in 
letter of resignation). 
 
   b. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(B), a party also may adopt another’s 
statement as his or her own 
 
 E.g., United States v. McKinney, 345 Fed. Appx. 206 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 
(unpublished) (defendant adopted truth of child’s statement, by admitting that he had molested 
her). 
 
  2. Rule 803(3):  Statements by declarant directly asserting his or her 
present state of mind at the time of the statement 
 
 In hostile environment cases, not only must the plaintiff show that a “reasonable person” 
would find the environment abusive, but that also must have been the plaintiff’s subjective 
feeling.  Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
 
 Q10: Hostile work environment plaintiff complains to co-worker, “I can’t stand it 
here.  I am upset all the time.”  Response to a hearsay objection? 
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 E. Rule 805:  Double/Multiple Hearsay 
 
 If the statement offered is that of one out-of-court declarant who was repeating another 
out-of-court statement by himself or another person, a hearsay exception (or relevant nonhearsay 
purpose) must be shown to apply for each statement in order to admit both. 
 
        ● E.g., Nyack v. Southern Connecticut State Univ., 424 F.Supp.2d 370, 374-76 (D. 
Conn. 2006) (three proffered “double hearsay” statements were admissible against 
defendant as statements by its agent, under Rule 801(d)(2)(D), because both 
declarants exercised supervisory authority over the plaintiff; a fourth was 
excluded, because the employee who repeated the supervisor’s statement was 
“outside the personnel decisionmaking hierarchy governing [plaintiff’s] 
conduct”). 
 
 Double hearsay, multiple-declarant issues often arise as to documents offered as business 
records under Rule 803(6).  If a person whose statement is offered for its truth is not a part of the 
business, another route around the hearsay rule must be found for that statement.   
 
 The same is true for EEOC determinations offered under Rule 803(8)(C).   The term 
“factual findings” in 803(8)(C) has been interpreted not to embrace hearsay that was the basis for 
such findings.  E.g., Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mmahat, 907 F.2d 546, 551 n.6 (5th Cir. 
1990) (“Though factual findings are admitted by Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C), hearsay statements 
contained in the report are not.”).  To admit such other hearsay, another hearsay exception or a 
nonhearsay purpose must be cited.    
 
 Of course, factual findings appearing to be unreliable ought be excluded either under the 
final clause at the end of Rule 803(8)(C) if the opponent shows that they are unreliable, e.g., 
Clark v. Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290 (3d Cir. 1994), or, in the court’s discretion, the EEOC 
determination may be excluded under Rule 403.  Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 
167 (1988).   
 
 Q11: Are EEOC personnel experts, so that hearsay that they “reasonably relied 
on” may be admitted, in their reports, for a limited purpose under Rule 703?   
 
        ● See Coleman v. Home Depot, Inc., 306 F.3d 1333, 1345 (3d Cir. 2002) (EEOC 
reports are not “expert opinion evidence”; no abuse of discretion in excluding 
report under Rule 403).  
 
VI. AUTHENTICATION IN THE DIGITAL ERA:  RULES 901-902 
 
 A. Lorraine   
 
 For a complete run-down, see Judge Grimm’s opinion in Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. 
Co., 241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007). 
  
22 
 
 B. E-Mail 
 
        ● U.S. E.E.O.C. v. Olsten Staffing Servs. Corp., 657 F.Supp.2d 1029, 1033-34 
(W.D. Wis. 2009) (testimony of human resources manager of employer, who 
personally retrieved from employee’s computer an e-mail purporting to come 
from defendant, adequately authenticated it; “[Defendant] Olsten argues that only 
the author of the e-mails may authenticate them, but cites no authority for this 
proposition and assumes incorrectly that a witness must have personal knowledge 
of the contents of a document in order to authenticate it.  If Olsten were correct, 
then e-mails would be inadmissible in any case in which the purported author 
denied their accuracy.  The rules of evidence are not so punctilious. * * * 
Testimony from someone who personally retrieved the e-mail from the computer 
to which the e-mail was allegedly sent is sufficient for this purpose.  further, as 
the EEOC observes, even without a custodian, e-mails may be authenticated 
through the e-mail addresses in the headers and other circumstantial evidence, 
such as the location where the e-mail was found.”) (emphasis in original; citations 
omitted).   
 
        ● See Rules 901(b)(1) and (4). 
 
 C. Internet 
 
        ● Safer, Inc. v. OMS Investments, Inc., 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1031, 1039 (U.S. Pat. & 
Trademark Office, Trademark Trial & Appeal Bd. 2010) (Board will deem a 
document obtained from the Internet, “identifying its date of publication or date 
that it was accessed and printed, and its source (e.g., the URL),” as genuine).  
 
        ● Griffin v. State, ___ A.2d ___, 2010 WL ____ (Md. App. May 27, 2010) (Sept. 
Term 2008, No. 1132) (no error in admitting MySpace page as sufficiently 
authenticated by circumstantial evidence, including photo, birth date, and 
nickname, as belonging to murder defendant’s girlfriend; page contained a threat 
against “snitches,” and was admitted to corroborate state’s witness’s testimony as 
to why he had not identified defendant at his first trial).  
 
        ● See Rule 901(b)(4). 
 
VII. ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE 
 
 A. Interlocutory Appeal of Privilege Rulings 
 
 Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (U.S. Dec. 8, 2009), held that trial 
court orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under 
the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
 
 In Mohawk Industries, the employee had sued his employer, alleging that he had been 
fired to prevent him from testifying about the employer’s hiring of illegal aliens.  The trial court 
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had ordered the employer to disclose information related to the employee’s pre-termination 
interview with the employer’s attorney. 
 
 Q12. What are the ramifications of the Mohawk Industries decision?  If the trial 
court finds, for example, that a defendant employer’s reliance on an internal 
investigation has waived its attorney-client privilege, what can defense 
counsel do?   
 
 And what are counsel’s ethical obligations, if counsel believes that the trial court’s 
ruling is legally incorrect?  Should counsel refuse to comply, so as to be held in civil 
contempt?   
 
        ● See, e.g., In re Fannie Mae Securities Litig., 552 F.3d 814 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(affirming contempt sanction for failure to comply with discovery deadline). 
 
 B. Applicability of Work Product 
 
 The circuits remain divided on the applicability of the work product doctrine to papers 
like tax-accrual documents, which provide legal assessments of how much  money a company 
should put aside for possible tax liability.   
 
 The First Circuit held, en banc, that such papers and others are unprotected as attorney 
work product (they had been too widely distributed to be protected by the attorney-client 
privilege), unless they were prepared specifically for litigation, and the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in that case.  United States v. Textron Inc. & Subsidiaries, 577 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 2010 WL 2025145 (U.S. May 24, 2010). 
 
VIII. SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE: ADVERSE INFERENCE – EMPLOYER’S 
OBLIGATION TO PRESERVE POSSIBLE E-MAIL EVIDENCE WHEN 
FACING LITIGATION 
 
 A person’s spoliation of evidence gives rise to a permissible adverse inference of “guilty 
knowledge,” offered to prove the truth of that person’s implied assertion, “I did something 
wrong, and I need to hide it.” 
 
 Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(f), as amended effective December 1, 2006, precludes an adverse 
inference when loss of evidence was “a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an 
electronic information system.” 
 
        ● Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Bank of Am. Sec. 
Litig., 685 F.Supp.2d 456 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (imposing sanctions on plaintiffs who 
all were either negligent or grossly negligent due to their failure “to timely 
institute written litigation holds and engag[ing] in careless and indifferent 
collection efforts after the duty to preserve arose,” which caused loss or 
destruction of some documents).  Judge Sheila Scheindlin wrote: 
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 After a discovery duty is well established, the failure to adhere to 
contemporary standards can be considered gross negligence.  Thus, after 
the final relevant Zubulake opinion in July, 2004, the following failures 
support a finding of gross negligence, when the duty to preserve has 
attached: to issue a written litigation hold; to identify all of the key players 
and to ensure that their electronic and paper records are preserved; to 
cease the deletion of e-mail or to preserve the records of former employees 
that are in a party’s possession, custody, or control; and to preserve 
backup tapes when they are the sole source of relevant information or 
when they relate to key players, if the relevant information maintained by 
those players is not obtainable from readily accessible sources. 
 
She imposed monetary sanctions on and adverse inferences as to all the plaintiffs.  
The jury instruction regarding only those plaintiffs she found to be grossly 
negligent informed the jury that it might “presume” that any lost evidence would 
have been favorable to the defendants (but that the presumption was rebuttable). 
 
        ● Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, ___ F. Supp.2d ___, 2010 WL 645 
253 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2010) (in Fifth Circuit, unlike in Second Circuit, no 
adverse inference arises when party is negligent or grossly negligent; “As a 
general rule, in this circuit, the severe sanctions of granting default judgment, 
striking pleadings, or giving adverse inference instructions may not be imposed 
unless there is evidence of ‘bad faith.’ ”) (emphasis added).  Judge Rosenthal 
found that the defendants, former employees, had intentionally and in bad faith 
spoliated documents, reviewed the varying rules among all the other circuits, as 
well (nn. 10-13 and accompanying text). 
 
        ● Thompson v. HUD, 219 F.R.D. 93 (D. Md. 2003) (imposing sanctions but not 
adverse inference instruction). 
 
        ● Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), subsequent 
proceeding, 382 F.Supp.2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).  Defendant’s personnel deleted 
e-mails after a gender discrimination lawsuit had been filed, “even though they 
had received at least two directions from counsel not to.”  The court imposed an 
adverse inference instruction, awarded reimbursement of costs of redeposing 
individuals, and awarded attorneys’ fees for a sanctions motion.  Counsel has a 
duty “to effectively communicate” discovery obligations to the client, and “once 
the duty to preserve attaches, counsel must identify sources of discoverable 
information.”  Counsel “must put in place a litigation hold, and make that known 
to all relevant employees by communicating with them directly.”  This includes 
stopping any routine e-mail deletion, as well as routine destruction of “back up 
tapes.” 
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IX. QUON’S EVIDENTIARY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 A. Cert. Granted in Quon, a Text Messaging Case 
 
 As stated by Judge Wardlaw, writing for a panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Quon: 
 
The recently minted standard of electronic communication via e-mails, text 
messages, and other means opens a new frontier in Fourth Amendment 
jurisdiction that has been little explored.  Here, we must first answer the threshold 
question:  Do users of text messaging services . . . have a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their text messages stored on the service provider’s network?  We 
hold that they do. 
 
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904, 91 Empl. Prac. Dec. P. 43,233, 155 
Lab.Cas. P 60,628 (9th Cir. 2008), reh’g en banc denied, 554 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied sub nom. USA Mobility Wireless, Inc. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) (No. 
08-1472), cert. granted sub nom. City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 1011 (U.S. Dec. 14, 2009) 
(No. 08-1332), oral argument, 2010 WL 154005 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2010). 
 
 B. The Decision Below 
 
 The Ninth Circuit held that a public employer, a California city police department, had, 
as a matter of law, violated its employees’ Fourth Amendment rights under the facts of the case. 
 
 The city contracted with Arch Wireless to provide text-messaging services, and issued 
pagers to twenty-two employees, including police sergeant Quon.  Under the contract, the city 
would have to pay monthly overage charges for any pager that texted more than 25,000 
characters that month.  Sergeant Quon was told that they city’s “Computer Usage, Internet, and 
E-Mail Policy,” which he had earlier signed, and which provided that the users “should have no 
expectation of privacy or confidentiality when using these resources,” extended to the pager text 
messages.  But when he exceeded 25,000 characters, the police lieutenant in charge told him that 
he would not audit his messages if Sgt. Quon personally paid for the overage. 
 
 After several months in which Sgt. Quon had overages and the lieutenant’s informal 
policy was followed, the police chief decided to see whether the department should contract for a 
higher monthly allotment than 25,000 characters.  He ordered the lieutenant to obtain and audit 
transcripts to see how many characters were being used for official, rather than personal, matters. 
 
 In response to the city’s (the subscriber’s) request, Arch Wireless released to the city 
transcripts of Sgt. Quon’s sent and received messages—including sexually explicit messages 
among the sergeant, his wife, a fellow male sergeant, and a female police dispatcher.  Sgt. Quon 
and the people with whom he “texted” sued. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit first held that the district court had erred as a matter of law in not 
granting the plaintiffs’ summary judgment against Arch  Wireless under the Stored 
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Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (1986), part of the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act.  The district court had erroneously held that Arch Wireless was a “remote 
computing service,” so that it could release private communication with the consent of the 
subscriber.  Rather, Arch was an “electronic communication service,” which under the Act could 
release private information only to, or with the lawful consent of, “an addressee or intended 
recipient of such communication.” 
 
 Next—and this is the issue on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari—the Ninth 
Circuit held that the district court erred in not having granted summary judgment for Sgt. 
Quon and the others on the ground that their Fourth Amendment rights (and their privacy 
rights under the California Constitution, construed in pari material) had been violated by the 
city and their employer, the police department. 
 
 The Ninth Circuit reached the following decisions: 
 
  1. Reasonableness of expectation of privacy 
 
 The plaintiffs had “a reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of their text 
messages vis-a-vis the service provider.”  They could not reasonably expect privacy as to the 
“address” of their messages (analogizing to the address on a mailed envelope or the numbers 
dialed on a phone).  And had Sgt. Quon consented to the audit, his correspondents would have 
had no claim.  But they “had a reasonable expectation that the Department would not review 
their messages absent consent from either a sender or recipient of the text messages.”   
 
 Due to the informal policy followed within the police department, Sgt. Quon had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy from intrusion by his employer.  “[T]he fact that a hypothetical 
member of the public [might] request Quon’s text messages [under the California Public Records 
Act] might slightly diminish his expectation of privacy in the messages, [but] it does not make 
his belief in the privacy of the text messages objectively unreasonable.” 
 
  2. Reasonableness of the search 
 
 The jury had found that the department’s purpose in auditing the text messages was to 
determine whether the character limit should be raised above 25,000, so as “to ensure that 
officers were not being required to pay for work-related expenses.”  The Ninth Circuit found this 
to be “a legitimate work-related rationale. . . .”  But it found that, as a matter of law, “the search 
was not reasonable in scope,” as there was: 
 
a host of simple ways to verify the efficacy of the 25,000 character limit (if that, 
indeed, was the intended purpose) without intruding on Appellants’ Fourth 
Amendment rights.  For example, the Department could have warned Quon that 
for the month of September he was forbidden from using his pager for personal 
communications, and that the contents of all of his messages would be reviewed 
to ensure the pager was used only for work-related purposes during that time 
frame.  Alternatively, if the Department wanted to review past usage, it could 
have asked Quon to count the characters himself, or asked him to redact personal 
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messages and grant permission to the Department to review the redacted 
transcript.  Under this process, Quon would have an incentive to be truthful 
because he may have previously paid for work-related overages and presumably 
would want the limit increased to avoid paying for such overages in the future.  
* * *  Instead, the Department opted to review the contents of all the messages, 
work-related and personal, without the consent of Quon or the remaining 
Appellants.  This was excessively intrusive in light of the noninvestigatory object 
of the search, and because Appellants had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
those messages, the search violated their Fourth Amendment rights. 
 
 C. Arizona Public Records Requests:  Metadata is to Be Disclosed 
 
 In Lake v. City of Phoenix, 222 Ariz. 547, 218 P.3d 1004, 107 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 1142 (2009) (en banc), the Supreme Court of Arizona held that a police officer seeking 
the electronic version of public records, his supervisor’s notes on the officer’s work 
performance, is entitled to disclosure, under the Arizona public records statute, of the electronic 
version of the record, including any embedded “inherent or ‘application’ metadata.”  The 
officer suspected that the paper copies provided to him had been backdated. 
 
 Justice Bales, writing for a unanimous court, reasoned: 
 
 The metadata in an electronic document is part of the underlying 
document; it does not stand on its own.  When a public officer uses a computer to 
make a public record, the metadata forms part of the document as much as the 
words on the page.  Arizona’s public records law requires that the requestor be 
allowed to review a copy of the “real record.”  It would be illogical, and contrary 
to the policy of openness underlying the public records laws, to conclude that 
public entities can withhold information embedded in an electronic document, 
such as the date of creation, while they would be required to produce the same 
information if it were written manually on a paper public record. 
 
 We accordingly hold that when a public entity maintains a public record in 
an electronic format, the electronic version of the record, including any embedded 
metadata, is subject to disclosure under our public records law. 
 
 Our decision is unlikely to result in the “administrative nightmare” that the 
City envisions.  A public entity is not required to spend “countless hours” 
identifying metadata; instead, it can satisfy a public records request merely by 
providing the requestor with a copy of the record in its native format.  
Additionally, not every public records request will require disclosure of the native 
file.  Public entities may provide paper copies if the nature of the request 
precludes any need for the electronic version.  Public records requests that are 
unduly burdensome or harassing can be addressed under existing law, which 
recognizes that disclosure may be refused based on concerns of privacy, 
confidentiality, or the best interests of the state. 
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 We do not here decide when a public entity is required to retain public 
records in electronic format.  That a public record currently exists in an electronic 
format, and is subject to disclosure in that format, does not itself determine 
whether there is a statutory obligation to preserve it electronically. 
 
(Citations omitted.) 
 
 D. More on Discovery—and Privacy—in the Digital Age 
 
 Was the alleged harasser or the plaintiff where he or she claims to have been?  See 
Wong, Online Trail Fraught with Risks, BALT. SUN, Mar. 19, 2010, at 18A (“Experts say it’s one 
thing to use social media to talk about a movie or your meal.  It’s another to let the digital 
universe know that you are, say, at New York’s LaGuardia Airport right now and not at home.  
Many people remain complacent about using online privacy settings.  An added complication of 
these applications is that they link up with Facebook and Twitter, allowing a larger audience to 
see location-based updates.  This month, Twitter introduced its own location-based feature and 
Facebook is expected to do the same.”). 
 
        ● See also Bahadur, Electronic Discovery, Informational Privacy, Facebook and 
Utopian Civil Justice, 79 MISS. L.J. 317 (2009) (proposing an expansion of “the 
information-sharing model” created by Rule 502(d) and the related amendments 
to the Fed.R.Civ.P.).   
 
 
